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NLRB INVESTIGATORY RECORDS: DISCLOSURE UNDER
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
Louis A. Fuselier*
Armin J. Moeller, Jr. **
A fundamental maxim of American political philosophy is the
right of each citizen to know what his government is doing.' Political
leaders have repeatedly assured the American people that govern-
ment activities are consistent with the ideals of a free and open
society. Whatever confidence the American people may have be-
stowed upon their government as a result of such pronouncements,
it was shattered by the revelations of Watergate, and other allega-
tions of illegal activities attributed to several government agencies.
Concurrent with these debilitating developments was the less visi-
ble bureaucratic obstruction of the Freedom of Information Act of
1966 (FOIA). 2
The Freedom of Information Act was the result of more than a
decade of congressional hearings concerning the withholding of in-
formation by the federal bureaucracy. It was prompted to a great
extent by the inadequacy of section 3 of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act of 1946, 3 which had become as much a basis for withhold-
ing information as one for disclosure.4 In passing the FOIA, Congress
intended that "any person" should have access to identifiable fed-
eral agency records unless those records were subject to one of nine
* B.S., Louisiana State University, 1953; LL.B., Louisiana State University, Tulane Uni-
versity, 1959. Partner, Fuselier, Ott, McKee & Flowers, Jackson, Mississippi.
** B.A., Tulane University, 1969; J.D., Louisiana State University, 1972. Associated with
Fuselier, Ott, McKee & Flowers, Jackson, Mississippi.
I. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, SUBCOMM. ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND
INDIVIDUAL. RIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, 94th CONG., 1st SESS., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.
L. 93-502), SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 472 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as SOURCE BOOKI.
2. 5 U.S.C. § 522(9) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(6) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq. (1946).
4. See H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972). The House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations criticized the Administrative Procedure Act for its vague and overbroad
exemptions for any document which required secrecy "in the public interest" or for any
document related solely to an agency's internal management. The Act also contained a catch-
all phrase for the withholding of any document where "good cause" was found. Id. at 3.
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specific exemptions ' and the burden of proving the applicability of
any exemption was to be carried by the federal agency. The Act was
vigorously opposed by various government agencies contending
that, if such a law were passed, the result would be a "bureaucratic
nightmare" simply because of the tremendous administrative bur-
den of providing information to everyone who requested it. More-
over, it was argued that extensive litigation could ensue each time
an agency refused to disclose the information sought.'
Though the federal agencies were not able to prevent the enact-
ment of the FOIA, they were successful in frustrating its purpose
through continued bureaucratic foot-dragging and litigation.7 In a
series of cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in 1973 and 1974, the nine exemptions to the
FOIA were construed so as to include practically any information
the Government so designated. Indeed, the Supreme Court agreed
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976) provides
exemptions for those documents which are:
(1) specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of the
national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be avail-
able by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent
available by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition report prepared
by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision
of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning
(oil) wells.
6. Opponents of the FOIA have repeatedly argued that FOI cases would flood the federal
courts. H.R. REP. No. 1419, supra note 4, at 78. Despite this opposition, the bill was signed
into law on July 4, 1966. Id. at 1.
7. Id. at 7-11, 20-42. Examples of the bureaucratic resistance referred to by the House
Committee on Government Operations included delays in responding to requests, abuse of
fee schedules, and overclassification of documents.
8. See Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race and Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d
370 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Aspin v. Dep't
of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Weisburg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d
1195, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973). These cases involved Exemption 7 and established that if infor-
mation is classified as an "investigatory" file it need not be disclosed regardless of whether
542
19761 NLRB INVESTIGATORY RECORDS 543
that, with respect to the national security exemption,9 such a classi-
fication was solely within the President's discretion.'"
The congressional response to the evils of Watergate, revelations
of illegal agency activities, and continuing bureaucratic obstruction
of the FOIA resulted in the passage of the 1974 amendments to the
FOIA." Congress, through those amendments, sought to establish
a philosophy of full agency disclosure.'2 The amendments clearly
increase the Government's burden to justify the withholding of in-
formation. This is done by giving any member of the public denied
disclosure the right to file an expedited action in federal district
court where the court will hear the matter de novo, with the agency
having the burden of justifying its action.'3 Further, the court has
the power to examine all requested agency records in camera in
order to determine the applicability of the exemptions.'4
Since the effective date of the FOIA amendments, numerous suits
have been instituted by respondents to National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) unfair labor practices proceedings, seeking disclo-
sure of particular information contained in the Board's investiga-
proceedings are likely in the future. Moreover even after proceedings are completed there is
no assurance that there will be no future proceedings and, therefore, disclosure is again not
required. In addition, enforcement proceedings are broader in scope than criminal proceed-
ings and can include any civil proceeding by a regulatory agency. On this basis, files on public
school segregation were not disclosed even though voluntary compliance was being sought;
files on correspondence between the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and
automobile manufacturers were not released because of a pending investigation; nor were files
on the adequacy of the Army's investigation of My Lai revealed even after some criminal
proceedings were terminated.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1967).
10. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart noted that
the FOIA exemption provides to the public no means of questioning an executive decision,
"however cynical, myopic, or even corrupt that decision might have been." Id. at 95.
11. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970). Among
other changes, Exemption 7 was substantially altered to exempt:
[IInvestigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent
the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings ...
(C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity
of a confidential source.
12. See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Bureaucratic resistance to these
amendments was intense and contributed significantly to President Ford's veto of the amend-
ments. SouRcE BOOK, supra note 1, at 481-85. Congress subsequently overrode the veto by an
overwhelming margin and these amendments became law on February 19, 1975. Id. at 431.
13. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
14. Id.
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tory files. Respondents before the NLRB find FOIA litigation espe-
cially appealing since Board complaints are merely notice plead-
ings,'9 and the Board does not permit pre-trial discovery.' Success-
ful FOIA plaintiffs may indeed be instituting a new era in unfair
labor practice trial preparation. 7 The Board, however, steadfastly
maintains that the FOIA does not require disclosure of its investiga-
tory records. The remainder of this article will analyze the legal
arguments advanced by the Board in refusing disclosure in light of
the recent amendments to the Act.
PRODUCTION CAUSING INTERFERENCE WITH ENFORCEMENT
PROCEEDINGS: EXEMPTION 7(A)
The Board asserts that Exemption 7,18 as originally enacted, pre-
vented a defendant (or respondent) in any criminal or civil law
enforcement proceeding from obtaining "any earlier or greater ac-
cess to the Government's case than it would have directly in such
litigation or proceeding."' 9 Courts ruling upon the issue upheld the
Board's position.2 " According to the Board's rationale, the language
and legislative history2 of amended Exemption 7 indicate that,
15. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.15 (1975) (specifying what facts a complaint must contain).
16. The Board is authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970) to prescribe discovery procedures
but has not done so. See NLRB v. Interboro Cont'rs, Inc., 432 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971); Electromec Design and Devel. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631 (9th
Cir. 1969); North American Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 800 (10th Cir. 1968); NLRB
v. Globe Wireless Ltd., 193 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1951).
17. Efforts to open the Board's investigatory files for pretrial preparation purposes by
amending the Board's Rules and Regulations have been commenced by a 27-member NLRB
Task Force now engaged in a two-year study of how Board procedures might be made more
efficient. See NLRB Task Force and NAM Comments, 91 LAB. L.J. 181 (1976).
18. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
19. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1967).
20. Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834
(1974); NLRB v. Clement Bros. Co., 407 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1969); Barceloneta Shoe Corp.
v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967). FOIA plaintiffs have generally conceded that
Board investigatory records did not have to be disclosed under the 1966 Act.
21. The Board has asserted in recent FOIA litigation that the following remarks of Senators
Hart and Kennedy support its position:
SENATOR HART: This amendment is by no means a radical departure from existing
case law under the Freedom of Information Act. Until a year ago the courts looked to
the reasons for the seventh exemption before allowing the withholding of documents.
That approach is in keeping with the intent of Congress and by this amendment we
wish to reinstall it as the basis for access to information.
SENATOR KENNEDY: As a matter of fact, looking back over the development of legisla-
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while Congress wanted to overrule the blanket exemption doctrine
espoused by earlier decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit, it
was still the intent of Congress to keep the investigatory records
exemption for the Board. 2 While some courts have agreed with the
Board's position,23 others have not. 4
The Board's position with respect to Exemption 7(A) is defective
on two points. First, proper statutory construction requires that
where language is clear and unambiguous, the words must be given
their ordinary meaning without resort to the legislative history.
25
Examination of amended Exemption 7 discloses that investigatory
records are exempt "only to the extent" that one of the specific
harms enumerated in subsections (A) through (E) can be shown, 26
tion under the 1966 Act and looking at the Senate Report language from that legisla-
tion, it was clearly the interpretation in the Senate's development of that legislation
that the 'investigatory file' exemption would be extremely narrowly defined. It was so
until recent times - really, until about the past few months. It is to remedy that
different interpretation that the amendment. . . was proposed. . . . Does the Sena-
tor's amendment in effect override the court decisions in the court of appeals on the
Weisberg against United States, Aspin against Department of Defense; Ditlow against
Brinegar; and National Center against Weinberger?
MR. HART: The Senator from Michigan [sic] is correct. That is its purpose ...
Until about 9 or 12 months ago, the courts had consistently approached it on a balanc-
ing basis, which is exactly what his amendment seeks to do. 120 CONG. REc. S 9330, S
9336 (daily ed. May 30, 1974).
22. See note 8 supra. Senator Hart remarked that the intent of the amendment was to
"prevent harm to the government's case in court by not allowing an opposing litigant earlier
or greater access to investigative files than he would otherwise have." 120 CONG. REc. S 9329
(daily ed. May 30, 1974). The Board contends that this statement supports its position that
no radical departure from existing precedent was intended.
23. See Hook Drugs, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2797 (S.D. Ind. 1976); Capital Cities v.
NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2565 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Local 30 v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2515 (E.D. Pa.
1976); Jamco Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2446 (N.D. Okla. 1976); Harvey's Wagon
Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2410 (W.D. Cal. 1976); Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2354 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Climax Molybendum Co. v. NLRB, 90 L.R.R.M.
3126 (D. Colo. 1975).
24. See Maremont Corp. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2804 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Bellingham
Frozen Foods v. Henderson, 91 L.R.R.M. 2764 (W.D. Wash. 1976); Goodfriend Western Corp.
v. Fuchs, 91 L.R.R.M. 2454 (D. Mass. 1976); St. Elizabeth's Hosp. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M.
2453 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Nash, 90 L.R.R.M. 3138 (D.S.C. 1975); Title
Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 90 L.R.R.M. 2849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, Docket No. 75-6119 (2d Cir.,
Apr. 2, 1976); Kaminer v. NLRB, 90 L.R.R.M. 2209 (S.D. Miss. 1975); Cessna Aircraft Co.
v. NLRB, 405 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Kan. 1975).
25. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961); FTC v. Retail Credit Co., 515 F.2d 988,
995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
26. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 413 (Congressman Reid).
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and the 1974 FOIA places the burden on the Board to show how
disclosure would result in one or more of the claimed harms." Sec-
ond, amended Exemption 7 does not contain the proviso of the
original exemption that "investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes [were exempt] except to the extent available
by law to a party other than an agency." While the Board's argu-
ment that the original FOIA did not provide greater access to inves-
tigatory records than the Board's Rules and Regulations permitted
was plausible under the original exemption language, 9 nothing in
the present language supports this contention.'"
One complicating factor in considering the legislative history is
the fact that agencies involved with the enforcement of federal labor
27. Id. at 522-23 (ATT'y GEN. MEM. ON THE 1974 AMENDMENTS TO THE FOI ACT.).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
29. Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D. Del. 1972), afi'd per curiam, 479 F.2d 317
(3d Cir. 1973).
30. The Board asserts that the legislative history clearly supports its position that only
Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and its progeny,
which granted a blanket privilege for investigatory materials, were intended to be overruled.
The problem inherent with the Board's analysis of the legislative history is its selection of
the remarks of only two Senators during one day of debate as indicating congressional intent.
Analysis of the relevant legislative history ordinarily requires an attempt to ascertain the
viewpoint of a majority of Senators and Congressmen. Apparently overlooked by the Board
in its 7(A) arguments in recent FOIA litigation is that Congress has published a comprehen-
sive report on the FOIA and its 1974 amendments, containing 564 pages of legislative history
and interpretative material. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1. Examination of the entire legislative
history does not indicate that Congress or President Ford were as naive about the language
of Exemption 7 as the Board claims. President Ford acknowledged in his veto message of
October 17, 1974 that Exemption 7 would
subject to compulsory disclosure (investigatory law enforcement records) at the request
of any person unless the Government could prove to a Court-separately for each
paragraph of each document-that disclosure 'would' cause the type of harm specified
in the Amendment. Id. at 484.
In the debate preceding the vote to override the President's veto, Senator Thurmond pointed
out in support of the President's veto that
[alnother objectionable area in H.R. 12471 deals with compulsory disclosure of the
confidential investigatory files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law
enforcement agencies. Id. at 466.
However, proponents of the Act contended that this is exactly what they intended the Act to
do. As Senator Kennedy noted:
Finally, the President has asked that we allow agencies to deny access to records where
the agency considers a review of the records to be impractical, and concludes that they
probably contain only investigatory records. This is but another attempt, hardly dis-
guised, to shut the door to access to FBI files and Congress should reject it resound-
ingly. Id. at 440.
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laws were never mentioned during the congressional debate. How-
ever, sensitive national security and criminal law enforcement agen-
cies such as the CIA, Department of Defense and FBI were men-
tioned repeatedly, 31 indicating that it was clearly the intent of
Congress, in rejecting President Ford's objections to Exemption 7,
to permit no federal agency to escape its specific requirements. 32
In recent cases, the Board has argued that investigatory records,
particularly affidavits taken during the course of an unfair labor
practice investigation, are exempt because of the Board's authority
under 29 U.S.C.'§ 160(b).33 This provision allows the Board to pre-
scribe its own discovery procedures which do not, in fact, provide
for access to statements obtained by Board agents unless and until
the affiant is called to testify in a formal proceeding. After the
affiant has testified, his affidavit is available for the limited purpose
of "examination [by the respondent] and for . . .cross examina-
tion. ' 34 Thus, if a litigant makes a timely request for such state-
ments, he may examine them and use them during cross examina-
tion, but he is not entitled to retain copies of them unless they are
admitted into evidence.3 5 Further, a respondent is not entitled to
31. For general congressional remarks relating to the CIA, Department of Defense and FBI
see 120 CONG. REC. S 19806 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974). See also H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra
note 12, and its definition of "agency".
32. As Judge Brown stated in Cessna Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 405 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (D.
Kan. 1975):
The Board in this instance may not avoid the consequences of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act by simply asserting that the requested documents are all subject to
exemption. . . .A review of the legislative history of the Freedom of Information Act
reveals that Government agencies have continually resisted legislation establishing a
right of access to information in agency files. . . .Blanket assertions of privilege and
exemption are not to be rubber-stamped by court approval, and as required by law,
the agency will be required to assume its burden of proof that a withheld document is
covered by specific statutory exemption.
33. See note 16 supra.
34. 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(b)(1) (1975) provides that statements are only available to a liti-
gant after a witness called by the General Counsel or by the charging party has testified in a
hearing upon a complaint. The Board's regulation has been consistently upheld in numerous
cases not involving an FOIA claim. NLRB v. Automotive Textile Prod. Co., 422 F.2d 1255
(6th Cir. 1970); Intertype Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1049 (1969); NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
823 (1961); Raser Tanning Corp. v. NLRB, 276 F.2d 80 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830
(1960); Intertype Co. v. Penello, 269 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Va. 1967).
35. Manbeck Baking Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1189-90 (1961); see NLRB Manual, Division
of Judges § "17380.11.
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production of the statement of any affiant who does not testify at
the hearing,3" so that he is often deprived of exculpatory material
in the possession of the General Counsel.
The Board's emphasis on its traditional authority to restrict pre-
trial disclosure, notwithstanding the recent amendments to the
FOIA, adds nothing to its primary claim that amended Exemption
7 was not intended to change the law with regard to disclosure of
Board investigatory records. What the Board really seems to be
saying is that its investigatory records are exempt simply because
the Board, through its interpretation of its regulations, says they
are. This position would appear to be an extension of the blanket
exemption doctrine formulated by the District of Columbia Circuit 3
before the FOIA amendments-a rationale Congress clearly wanted
to end.38
As a condition precedent to the withholding of any information
under this exemption, the agency must specify the alleged harm to
its law enforcement efforts. The Board advances three reasons why
statements contained in its investigatory records are exempt under
Exemption 7(A). First, the Board argues that its General Counsel,
who under the National Labor Relations Act 9 is charged with the
duty of investigating charges and issuing and prosecuting com-
plaints, must be able to present his strongest case to the Board and
the courts. The Board suggests that if it cannot keep its investiga-
tory records confidential until trial, suspected violators of the Act
will be able to frustrate enforcement proceedings or construct defen-
ses which would permit violations to go unremedied. But in FOIA
actions to date, the Board has failed to present any evidence to
support this contention. This argument seems particularly weak in
light of the fact that one of the primary purposes of the FOIA was
to require disclosure of information in order that agencies could not
bury their mistakes, cover up politically embarrassing actions or
36. See NLRB v. Clement Bros., Inc., 407 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir. 1969). Thus, 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.118(b)(1) (1975) incorporates the Jenck's Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1970), which "mani-
fests the general statutory aim to restrict the use of such statements to impeachment."
Polermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349 (1959).
37. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
38. See note 21 supra.
39. 29 U.S.C.A. § 153(d) (1973).
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conceal unfavorable agency publicity.'" The Board also alleges that
employees who are interviewed may be reluctant to have it known
that they gave information against their employer, for fear of incur-
ring his displeasure. While a number of courts4' have given consider-
able credence to this argument, the Board has not presented any
evidence in recent FOIA cases that specific harm has or is likely to
occur. While the Board desires to argue principle, the statute re-
quires the court to examine fact.4
Finally, the Board argues that statements in its investigatory
records may constitute an attorney's work product.4 3 Again, the re-
cent cases indicate the Board prefers to argue this point by principle
rather than by evidence. It is unlikely, however, that the attorney
work product privilege applies to many of the Board's affidavits
since nearly all of them are taken during the course of the Board's
investigation of unfair labor practice charges.4 4 Indeed, all that is
really sought at the investigatory stage is the "gathering of the
relevant facts. '45 Statements containing such relevant facts are fre-
quently taken by Board agents who are not attorneys. Moreover, the
taking of statements and ancillary matters during the investigation
do not constitute adversary proceedings.4 1
In essence, the Board argues that pre-amendment interpreta-
tions47 of Exemption 7, as well as the possibility that the FOIA could
40. Even under the original FOIA, Congress found that "in too many cases, information is
withheld, over classified, or otherwise hidden from the public to avoid administrative mis-
takes, waste of funds or political embarrassment." H.R. REP. No. 1419, supra note 4, at 8.
However, as the Supreme Court has pointed out, it is the Government's job to see that justice
is done without regard to merely winning or losing cases. Burger v. United States, 259 U.S.
78, 88 (1935), cited in Maremont Corp. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2804 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
41. See Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 430 (4th Cir. 1974); Surprenant Mfg.
Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 756, 763 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Northside Realty Assoc.,
324 F. Supp. 287, 295 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
42. See Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Nash, 90 L.R.R.M. 3138 (D.S.C. 1975); Title Guar. Co.
v. NLRB, 90 L.R.R.M. 2849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, Docket No. 75-6119 (2d Cir., Apr. 2,
1976); Kaminer v. NLRB, 90 L.R.R.M. 2269 (S.D. Miss. 1975); Cessna Aircraft Co. v. NLRB,
405 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Kan. 1975).
43. See NLRB v. Quest-Shon Mark Brassiere Co., 185 F.2d 285, 289-90 (2d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 812 (1951).
44. See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs BOARD CASEHANDLING MANUAL (PART 1) UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS (April, 1975 Edition) [hereinafter cited as CASEHANDLING MANUAL].
"The keystone of the investigation is the affidavit." Id. § 10058.2.
45. Id. § 10050.
46. Id. § 10058.2.
47. See, e.g., Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
19761
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obstruct Board enforcement proceedings, entitle it to a blanket ex-
emption. Nevertheless, the legislative history of amended Exemp-
tion 7 appears to indicate that Congress intended to allow an ex-
emption under 7(A) only when an agency carried its statutory bur-
den on a case-by-case basis." Recent litigation has shown that the
Board is unable, or at least unwilling, to meet its burden under the
FOIA of demonstrating the specific harm which it alleges will occur.
PRODUCTION CONSTITUTING AN INVASION OF PRIVACY: EXEMPTION 7(C)
Exemption 7(C) permits the withholding of investigatory records
''only to the extent that the production . . .would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."49 The Board claims that
if an individual can be said to possess a right of privacy, it must
include the right to select people to whom he will communicate his
ideas. Therefore, it would be a breach of this right for the Board to
be forced to release statements contained in its investigatory re-
cords.5" The Board reasons that an affiant's right to privacy, safe-
guarded by Congress in Exemptions 6 and 7(C), and section 2(b)(2)
of the Privacy Act of 1974, would be seriously diminished if disclo-
sure of the affiant's statement is required in circumstances other
than those set forth in the Board's Rules and Regulations.' As noted
in Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB,52 the Board's "contention that the
documents would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy seems to hinge on a rather wide interpretation of exemption
7(C)."
In its haste to defend its investigatory records against disclosure,
the Board apparently overlooked the fact that Congress expressly
834 (1974); NLRB v. Clement Bros., Inc., 407 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir. 1919); Barceloneta
Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591, 593-94 (D.P.R. 1967).
48. See note 32 supra.
49. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
50. The Board has cited the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (1974), as supporting
its position:
The purpose of this Act is to provide certain safeguards for an individual against an
invasion of personal privacy by requiring federal agencies except as otherwise provided
by law, to permit .. .an individual to prevent records pertaining to him obtained by
such agencies for a particular purpose from being used or made available for another
purpose without his consent. Id.
51. 29 C.F.R. § 102.118 (1975). See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
52. 90 L.R.R.M. 2829, 2853 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, Docket No. 75-6119 (2d Cir., Apr. 2,
1976).
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chose not to treat the Privacy Act as a guide to agencies in interpret-
ing the "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" clause in Ex-
emptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA. This fact is reflected in subsec-
tion (b)(2) of the Privacy Act, which permits an agency to disclose
a record about an individual without first obtaining the individual's
consent when disclosure is sought under the FOIA.53
The Board has also asserted that the affiant's privacy right must
be balanced against the public interest which FOIA litigants are
asserting. 5 However, to the extent that a balancing test may have
existed in determining whether or not an invasion of privacy was
warranted, it appears to have been abandoned in NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co.5" Curiously, the Board has not explained how the
right of privacy can include the "right to select the people to whom
. . . one will communicate his ideas.""6
Several recent decisions have rejected the Board's Exemption
7(C) contentions regarding disclosure of investigatory files as an
invasion of privacy.57 As pointed out in Title Guarantee Co. :8 "The
cases applying exemption 7(C) are generally concerned with items
which are much more commonly thought of as private." 9
53. Explaining subsection (b)(2) of the Privacy Act, the report of the House/Senate Staff
Conference on the Act states that it "is designed to preserve the status quo, as interpreted
by the courts, regarding the disclosure of personal information" under the FOIA. 120 CONG.
REC. S 21817, H 12244 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974). See also Metz, Privacy Legislation: Yester-
day, Today and Tomorrow, 34 FED. B.J. 311, 312 (1975).
54. Wine Hobby U.S.A., Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 1974).
55. 421 U.S. 132 (1975). The Court noted that Sears' rights under the Act are "neither
increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that it claims an interest. . . greater than that
shared by the aerage member of the public .. " Id. at 143 n.10.
56. Logical analysis of this concept indicates that the Board routinely violates these alleged
privacy rights through its own Jenck's rule and subpoena power. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.31,
102.118 (1975) (concerning supoenas and depositions). In Charles River Park "A", Inc. v.
HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court held that there was no such thing as a "reverse
FOI Act case"-a cause of action under the statute to prevent the voluntary release of
information furnished in confidence. See also Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
57. See, e.g., Bellingham Frozen Foods v. Henderson, 91 L.R.R.M. 2761 (W.D. Wash.
1976); Maremont Corp. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2804 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Goodfriend Western
Corp. v. Fuchs, 91 L.R.R.M. 2454 (D. Mass. 1976); St. Elizabeth's Hosp. v. NLRB, 91
L.R.R.M. 2453 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Climax Molybendum Co. v. NLRB, 90 L.R.R.M. 3121 (D.
Colo. 1975); Poss v. NLRB, Civ. No. 75-A-825 (D. Colo., Dec. 17, 1975); NLRB v. Hardemann
Garment Corp., 400 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Tenn. 1975).
58. 90 L.R.R.M. 2829 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, Docket No. 75-6119 (2d Cir., Apr. 2, 1976).
59. Id. at 2854. See, e.g., Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture,
497 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (information concerning marital status, legitimacy of children,
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DISCLOSURE OF A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE: EXEMPTION 7(D)
Exemption 7(D) permits withholding of investigative records
which would "disclose the identity of a confidential source."6 The
Board argues that, in effect, this is the traditional privilege afforded
government to protect its sources of law enforcement information.
The traditional source of information to the Board has been employ-
ees dissatisfied with the practices of their employer. Therefore, the
Board maintains that any employee reporting a violation is auto-
matically protected by this privilege.'
The problem with this approach is that it again involves argu-
ments based on assumptions which the Board has not yet seen fit
in FOIA cases to support with any evidence. The legislative history
indicates that in order for 7(D) to apply, a person must have pro-
vided information under an express assurance of confidentiality or
in circumstances from which such assurance could be reasonably
inferred.6" However, an examination of the Board's Rules and Regu-
lations and Casehandling Manual3 discloses that Board personnel
are not specifically empowered to grant assurances of confidential-
ity and are warned against making such promises. 4 The legislative
identity of fathers of children, medical conditions, welfare payments, alcoholic consumption,
family fights); Wine Hobby U.S.A., Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974) (home address,
family status); Ackerley v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (medical files); Ditlow v.
Schultz, 379 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974) (travel history).
60. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(b) (1975). See CONF. REP., H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974). As was noted in the report:
Substitution of the term 'confidential source' in § 522(b)(7)(D) is to make clear that
the identity of a person other than a paid informer may be protected if the person
provided information under an express assurance of confidentiality or in circumstances
from which such an assurance could be reasonably inferred. Under this category in
every case where the investigatory records sought were compiled for law enforcement
purposes - either civil or criminal in nature - the agency can withhold names, ad-
dresses, and other information that would reveal the identity of the confidential source
who furnished the information.
61. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wellman Indus., Inc., 490 F.2d 427, 431 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 934 (1974) (information of employee complaint held to be not subject to disclosure).
62. SoURcE BooK, supra note 1, at 230.
63. See note 44 supra.
64. CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 44, § 10058.4. The manual provides:
He Ithe affiantl should not be told that he will never be called on to testify, or that
we could 'protect' him under all circumstances. As for the confidential nature of his
information, he should be told the truth - that the information would be used by us in
ascertaining the total picture and this would be its only use unless and until he might
be called on to give his information in the form of testimony at a formal hearing or in
the unlikely event another agency made a valid request upon us for such information.
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history also emphasizes that an agency compiling investigatory re-
cords for civil law enforcement purposes can withhold only those
facts which identify the confidential source and not the information
supplied by that source. Therefore, if the non-exempt information
is requested it must be disclosed."
It is highly questionable whether the Board's affiants qualify as
confidential sources under the traditional criteria for confidential
informers." A traditional requirement of "informer" or "confiden-
tial source" status is an individual's unsolicited volunteering of con-
fidential information. This is precluded by the Board's procedures
in most instances which require the charging party to present wit-
nesses and documents in support of its charge under a threat of
dismissal.67 Another requirement of "informer" status is that those
volunteering confidential information are not "participants in the
transaction."6 However, individuals who give statements to the
Board are invariably "participants in the transaction" with respect
to the unfair labor practice charges. Consequently, few sources will
reach the status of informer under traditional definitions.
The Board's current Casehandling Manual does not give its inves-
tigators the authority to grant express assurances of confidential-
ity. 9 While the Board argues that it has the express right to grant
confidential status to individuals, a number of court decisions hold
that an agency cannot, by claiming to give such assurances or even
by giving such assurances, arbitrarily defeat the rights of FOIA
litigants to disclosure. Otherwise, the FOIA would be rendered a
nullity.70
65. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976) provides:
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person request-
ing such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection.
See also 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
66. For a traditional definition of "informer," see Gordon v. United States, 438 F.2d. 858
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971) (undisclosed person who volunteers information
in confidence without solicitation by police interviews or investigation).
67. CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 44, § 10050 et seq.
68. Gordon v. United States, 438 F.2d 858, 874-75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828
(1971).
69. See note 64 supra.
70. Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir.
1973).
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PRODUCTION OF CONFIDENTIAL AGENCY MATERIALS: EXEMPTION 5
The last exemption which will be discussed deals with "inter-
agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters which by law would
not be available to a party other than an agency in litigation with
the agency."17' While the Board acknowledges that this section ex-
empts "those documents . . . normally privileged in the civil dis-
covery context,1 2 it asserts that this extends to Board statements
because they may reflect the attorney's work product or the Govern-
ment's "executive privilege," thereby reflecting the agency's delib-
erative processes.73 The problem with the Board's position is that,
according to its own procedures, Board statements are supposed to
reflect the investigator's "gathering of the relevant facts" from wit-
nesses. 74 In addition, Board procedures do not provide a means for
the agency's deliberative processes to be included in anyone's affi-
davit or investigatory record. 75 The Board's deliberative processes
are reflected in the investigator's written report recommending for
or against the issuance of a complaint, and in the minutes prepared
from the regional committee meetings or committee discussion.
However, these reports have no relationship to the facts contained
in an affiant's statements. 7 Essentially, the Board seeks again
through Exemption 5 to bootstrap its 7(A) argument while failing
to offer any evidence in recent FOIA cases to support its contention.
CONCLUSION
The promise of the FOIA amendments ushering in a new era of
government disclosure has not yet led to NLRB openness about its
investigatory 'records. The Board still refuses to acknowledge that
the recent amendments to the FOTA apply to the information ob-
71. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
72. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975).
73. Id. at 150-54.
74. CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 44, § 10058.2.
75. Id.
76. Even items generally privileged from disclosure in the civil discovery context must
often be disclosed. In United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975), Justice White observed:
"[E]ven in the pretrial discovery area in which the work product rule does apply, work
product notions have been thought insufficient to prevent discovery of evidentiary and
impeachment material." Id. at 249 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis in original), citing
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
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tained by its investigators during unfair labor practice investiga-
tions. Through such methods, agencies are again seeking "with
some help from the Courts . . .to enlarge [the amendments] into
gaping and blanket exemptions."77 While the results from FOIA
litigation in the federal district courts are inconclusive at this time,
the importance of the issue to both sides indicates that it ultimately
must be decided by the Supreme Court.
If the Board is unable to restore its blanket exemption status
under the amended FOIA, significant changes in the Board's unfair
labor practice trial strategy will be required. Victory by FOIA liti-
gants on the issue of pretrial disclosure of statements taken during
the course of the Board's investigation would, under present circum-
stances, place the Board at a distinct disadvantage in prosecuting
unfair labor practices. Since the Board's present rules do not permit
pretrial discovery, the Board would be required to disclose its evi-
dence, while the respondent would not. Future FOIA developments
may require the Board to reappraise its civil discovery policy or its
present pretrial policy since the present practice may keep only the
Board itself in darkness.
77. SOURCE BooK, supra note 1, at 469 (Senate Action and Vote on Presidential Veto,
November 21, 1974).
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